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In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef,1 the Supreme Court de-
cided that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA)2 did not preempt an Illinois employee's state law retaliatory dis-
charge claim. Section 301 gives the federal courts jurisdiction over law-
suits arising from collective bargaining agreements (CBA's).3 Lingle at-
tempted to clarify section 301's preemptive scope, but the decision has
actually caused continued uncertainty in section 301 preemption cases. Al-
though the Court held that plaintiff's state law claim was not preempted,
its language potentially broadened section 301's preemptive power. This
Note argues that courts should use a narrower test in section 301 preemp-
tion cases: If a union member's cause of action does not depend on the
existence of a CBA, then his claim should not be preempted.
Over the past several decades, federal preemption of state labor law has
been one of the most confused areas of federal court litigation." Section
301 cases have constituted a large part of this litigation, especially as
states have passed more laws protecting employees. A section 301 contro-
versy commonly occurs when a union member covered by a CBA files a
complaint in state court and his employer raises the defense that section
301 preempts the employee's claim. If a case involving a section 301 issue
is removed to federal court,5 the federal court can assert its jurisdiction to
1. 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Section 301 of the LMRA is codified at 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
4. See, e.g., Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J.
277, 277 (1980) [hereinafter Recent Developments] ("In the field of industrial relations there has been
more than thirty years of fighting over the boundary lines defining the realm of exclusive federal
control."); Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or Last Hurrah?, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 565-66 (1986).
5. Cases where the plaintiff asserts a state law claim and the defendant raises a § 301 defense can
sometimes be removed to federal court on diversity grounds. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). The case can
also be removed if the plaintiff asserts any federal claim in addition to the state law claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c) (1982). Once the case is removed, the federal court can then decide the state law claim(s)
under its pendent jurisdiction. See F. JAMES AND G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.7 (3d ed.
1985). The plaintiff's state court action cannot be removed solely on the basis of the defendant's
assertion of a federal question in his defense. See id. at § 2.6. However, the "complete pre-emption
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resolve the dispute. If the defendant does not remove the case to federal
court, a state court has concurrent jurisdiction to decide section 301
claims.6
In Lingle, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff's state law
remedy for retaliatory discharge was "'independent' of the collective-
bargaining agreement in the sense of 'independent' that matters for § 301
pre-emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require
construing the collective-bargaining agreement."' At the conclusion of his
opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens summarized the current test for
section 301 preemption: "[Wie hold that an application of state law is
pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-
bargaining agreement." 8
According to the Court's earlier ruling in Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck,9 a
plaintiff's claim is preempted if it is "substantially dependent upon analy-
sis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor
contract."10 This contrasts with the Court's language in Lingle, which
indicates that claims requiring any interpretation or analysis of a CBA
are preempted." The Lingle standard will create difficulties when the
plaintiff asserts a claim completely separate from the CBA but the defend-
ant cites CBA provisions as a defense."2 If the plaintiff asserts an indepen-
dent or nonnegotiable state law claim,"3 resolution of that claim is not
corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule" modifies this proposition: If a CBA clause forms the
basis for the plaintiff's claim, that claim is "purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact
that state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,
482 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1987) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)).
6. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 505 (1962) (state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over § 301 claims, although they must apply federal law in deciding such claims).
7. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1882 (1988).
8. Id. at 1885.
9. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
10. Id. at 220.
11. The Court stated in a footnote: "It is conceivable that a State could create a remedy that,
although nonnegotiable, nonetheless turned on the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement
for its application. Such a remedy would be preempted by § 301." Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882 n.7.
Also, as stated earlier, the Court asserted that Lingle's claim was not preempted because "resolution
of [her] . . . claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement," id. at 1882,
thereby indicating that her claim would have been preempted if it did require CBA interpretation.
Although this broad language was technically dicta, it has affected lower courts' adjudication of sec-
tion 301 cases. See infra section IID.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 62-77, 87-91, 95-96.
13. For the purposes of the proposed preemption test an "independent" state law claim is one that
an employee can bring without any employment contract. To be independent, the claim cannot arise
from contractual rights or implied contractual rights. A state law right therefore is not independent
and is preempted if no cause of action would exist without a CBA. See discussion of Allis-Chalmers,
infra section IIA(2). This definition of "independent" is different from the Court's use of the term in
Lingle-where "independent" means that no CBA interpretation is necessary. In the proposed test a
claim can still be "independent" even if its resolution requires CBA interpretation. Additionally, an
independent right can be negotiable or nonnegotiable. A negotiable state law right is independent if it
does not arise from the CBA and only the employer's defense mandates interpreting the CBA.
A nonnegotiable claim involves a state law right that cannot be altered by contract. A state statutory
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"substantially dependent" on CBA analysis because a court can base its
decision on independent state law standards. However, that claim may
involve interpretation of the CBA to judge the validity of the respondent's
defense. Under a strict reading of the Court's language in Lingle, this
type of claim appears to be preempted because it requires CBA interpre-
tation. This could allow employers to assert invalid defenses under the
CBA simply to force a court to rule that the plaintiff's claim is
preempted.14
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lingle
reaches the correct result without using the most clear and equitable ap-
proach. Section I explains why section 301 should have a more limited
role in the overall scheme of federal preemption of state labor law. Section
II describes how the Lingle ruling broadens the scope of section 301 pre-
emption developed in prior Supreme Court decisions. It also demonstrates
that Lingle has not ended the confusion among circuit courts in deciding
section 301 cases. Section III advocates that courts adopt a new model for
determining whether section 301 preempts state law claims.
I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN THE LABOR LAW FIELD
Section 301 preemption represents a limited part of the larger scheme
of federal preemption in the labor law field. The Constitution permits
Congress to regulate labor relations in industries that affect commerce 5
claim is nonnegotiable unless the statute provides that unions can waive employees' rights in a CBA.
Similarly, a state common law claim is nonnegotiable unless the state courts have interpreted it as
waivable in contract. As the Supreme Court stated in Allis-Chalmers, "Clearly, § 301 does not grant
the parties to a collective bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under state
law." 471 U.S. at 212. State legislatures sometimes explicitly provide that certain statutory rights
cannot be changed by contract.
Nonnegotiable state law rights are therefore independent of CBA's by definition: they cannot be
altered by CBA negotiations. However, not all independent rights are nonnegotiable. Section 301
should not preempt nonnegotiable or independent negotiable state law claims.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 62-77, 87-91, 95-96. For example, a plaintiff can assert a
nonnegotiable state law claim such as handicap discrimination, which does not rely on the CBA or
require the court to conclude that the OBA was breached. The employer, however, can argue that his
actions were based on the plaintiff's breach of a CBA provision and that he therefore had no discrimi-
natory intent. In such a case, the plaintiff's state law claim is independent of the CBA, but the
employer's defense requires CBA interpretation. This Note argues that such claims should not be
preempted by § 301 because they do not arise from a breach of contract. This part of the test is
analogous to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule used in determining federal removal jurisdiction,
which provides that "a defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that
asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform an action into one arising under federal law,
thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be litigated." Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S.
386, 399 (1987). The proposed test goes further, however, in that it provides that a plaintiff's claim is
not preempted even if one of its elements requires CBA interpretation. In addition, the proposed test
follows "the complete preemption corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule" discussed supra note
5, which provides that even if a plaintiff asserts his claim under state law, if it is based on a CBA
violation, it is preempted by § 301. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (preemp-
tion of plaintiff's state law tort cause of action for bad faith handling of insurance claim); infra section
IIA(2).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 3; see, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937).
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and grants Congress the power to preempt state labor laws through the
supremacy clause.16 Several major pieces of legislation establish the basis
for federal labor law.' 7 Most preemption cases fall under the NLRA,
which encompasses the two main labor law preemption doctrines apart
from section 301 suits.
A. Section 301's Place in the Preemption Scheme
Compared to other forms of preemption under the NLRA, section 301's
scope should be clear-cut. It is only supposed to preempt causes of action
that rely on a CBA. This is not so simple an issue as it may seem, how-
ever. Sometimes it is unclear whether a plaintiff's state law claim is di-
rectly based upon interpretation of a CBA.
By enacting section 301, Congress gave federal courts jurisdiction over
disputes concerning labor contracts. Section 301 states in relevant part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
. . . , or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the par-
ties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties. 8
This language is very straightforward. Section 301 applies to "suits for
violation of contracts." Preemption should therefore occur only when a
plaintiff's cause of action is clearly for violation of a CBA.
When a court considers whether section 301 preempts a state law ac-
tion, its determination is distinct from other types of preemption analy-
sis. 9 As the following two sections demonstrate, these other preemption
doctrines invalidate state laws that interfere with the NLRA's purposes.
Therefore, section 301 cases need not address whether a state law itself
contradicts congressional intent as expressed in the NLRA.
16. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
CONs-r. art. VI, cl. 2.
17. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (incorpo-
rates and amends the NLRA); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982 & Supp. V
1987) [hereinafter NLRA]; Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter LMRDA]; Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). As this provision shows, section 301 covers cases brought by un-
ions and employers as well as by employees. This Note addresses only individual employees' suits.
19. See infra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
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B. Other Preemption Doctrines
One of the two major theories of labor law preemption involves the
primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)."°
The leading Supreme Court case in this area is San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon.2 1 In Garmon, the Court ruled that
[w]hen it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a
State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due
regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must
yield.22
In fact, the Court expanded this restriction to conduct that is "arguably"
protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8.23
Lodge 76, Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commis-
sion24 represents the theory behind the other major line of federal labor
law preemption cases.25 In Machinists, the Supreme Court ruled that the
NLRA preempted a Wisconsin state law empowering the state labor
board to enjoin union members from refusing to work overtime. The
Court based its ruling on the principle that state laws could not regulate
activities that Congress meant to be left as economic weapons for labor
and management.2 ' Thus, if certain state laws avoid preemption under
sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA, they might still be preempted under the
Machinists test.
Machinists preemption also affects state laws that may interfere with
the negotiation or enforcement of a CBA.2" For example, in Local 24,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver,28 the Court ruled that
an Ohio antitrust law was preempted because its application "would frus-
trate the parties' solution of a problem which Congress has required them
to negotiate in good faith toward solving, and in the solution of which it
20. See, e.g., A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 892-922
(1986) (subchapter on preemption of state labor law); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85
HARV. L. REv. 1337, 1337-51 (1972) [hereinafter Preemption Revisited]; Comment, Employment At-
Will in the Unionized Setting, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 979, 990-93 (1985).
21. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
22. Id. at 244.
23. Id. at 245. Section 7 of the NLRA protects workers' "right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ...." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 8 prohibits a variety of unfair labor practices. 29
U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
24. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
25. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 20, at 993-95; A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note
20.
26. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140-41, 155.
27. See generally Comment, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 635, 644-47 (1983) (describing two types of preemption that fall under Machinists analy-
sis: "bargaining process preemption" and "bargaining agreement preemption").
28. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
1989]
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imposed no limitations relevant here.""9 Oliver held that a state cannot
pass a law that significantly interferes with mandatory bargaining subjects
such as wages, hours, and working conditions.
In later cases, however, the Court narrowed the Oliver, Garmon, and
Machinists preemption holdings by providing for various exceptions. 30
The states therefore retain the power to regulate employment relations in
areas that Congress did not intend to leave solely to federal law or the
arbitration system. Because of the scope of the Garmon and Machinists
preemption doctrines, section 301 cases do not need to address the issue of
the state law's validity. Disputes about section 301 preemption involve a
completely separate analysis in which courts should decide only whether
the plaintiff's claim directly arises from a CBA breach.
II. THE FEDERAL COURTS' APPROACH TO SECTION 301
PREEMPTION
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Prior to Lingle
The Supreme Court's decision in Lingle represents the current stan-
dard for judging section 301 cases. Lingle's test that a plaintiffs state law
action avoids preemption if it is (a) based on a nonnegotiable state law
right, and (b) independent from interpretation of a CBA, extends the
scope of prior Supreme Court decisions defining section 301's limits.
1. Lincoln Mills and Lucas Flour
Ten years after Congress passed the LMRA, the Supreme Court ruled
that section 301 authorized the courts to develop a federal common law of
interpreting CBA's.31 By examining the "somewhat cloudy and confus-
ing"3' 2 legislative history of section 301, the Court concluded that Congress
intended that federal courts have the authority to enforce CBA's. Al-
though Lincoln Mills did not address the question of preemption, it set
29. Id. at 296.
30. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (Massachusetts
law providing minimum health care benefits for insured workers not preempted, limiting scope of
Machinists preemption); New York Tel. Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979)
(New York law providing unemployment benefits to workers eight weeks after their employment
ended by strike not preempted); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978) (Minnesota law
requiring pension funding charge to employers ending pension plan not preempted by NLRA, even if
it contradicts CBA terms, because Congress intended that states be allowed to regulate pension plan%,);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (Cali-
fornia state courts have power to enjoin union picketing on Sears' property in absence of charge filed
with NLRB); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)
(plaintiff's state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress unpreempted; exception to
Garmon analysis); see also Cox, Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 279-96 (discussing Sears and
New York Telephone).
31. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
32. Id. at 452.
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the stage for later preemption cases by establishing the importance of ap-
plying federal law in interpreting CBA's.
The Supreme Court first decided whether section 301 preempts state
law in Local 174, Teamsters of America v. Lucas Flour Co. 3 Lucas
Flour held that state courts could not apply local contract law to enforce
CBA's. Reversing the Supreme Court of Washington, the Court ruled
that "[t]he dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive
principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by
the statute." '34 The Washington state court therefore should have applied
federal contract law to resolve the dispute.
The results of Lincoln Mills and Lucas Flour are fairly straightfor-
ward: Section 301 authorizes the courts to establish a federal common law
for interpreting CBA's, and states cannot use local rules to resolve breach
of CBA disputes. Controversy arises, however, when a plaintiff brings a
claim that does not sound in breach of contract, but nevertheless impli-
cates the CBA. Because of confusion among state and federal courts over
how to resolve this issue, the Supreme Court has attempted to define the
parameters of section 301 preemption.
2. Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck
The confusion among circuit courts leading to the Supreme Court's
grant of certiorari in Lingle stemmed from the Court's decision in Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck.3" In Allis-Chalmers, the Court ruled that sec-
tion 301 preempted a Wisconsin employee's state law cause of action for
bad faith handling of an insurance claim. Wisconsin courts recognized the
bad faith handling of insurance claims as a tort under state law. The
Supreme Court held that this state law tort could not extend to employees
covered by a CBA.
Instead of attempting to solve his problem through the CBA grievance
procedure, plaintiff Lueck filed a claim in Milwaukee County Circuit
Court." His complaint stated that Allis-Chalmers and Aetna Insurance
Company breached their duty of good faith by failing to pay his disability
benefits as provided in the CBA.3 Although the trial court ruled that
section 301 preempted Lueck's suit, the Wisconsin Supreme Court re-
versed on the principle that a bad faith tort claim is distinguishable under
Wisconsin law from a bad faith breach of contract claim. Even though the
breach of duty that constitutes the bad faith claim is based on contractual
33. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
34. Id. at 103.
35. 471 U.S. 202 (1985). After Allis-Chalmers but prior to Lingle, the Court decided two other
section 301 cases that applied the Allis-Chalmers preemption test: IBEW, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481
U.S. 851 (1987) and Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
36. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 206.
37. Id.
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rights, the Wisconsin court declared it independent of the CBA.38 The
Supreme Court reversed. Its decision turned on whether the Wisconsin
tort of bad faith was truly independent from interpretation of the CBA:
Our analysis must focus, then, on whether the Wisconsin tort action
for breach of the duty of good faith as applied here confers nonnego-
tiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any
right established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the
tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms
of the labor contract.3 9
In evaluating Lueck's claim, the Court held that it was "inextricably
intertwined" with the CBA. Since the tort of bad faith is based on the
breach of implied contract rights, Lueck's claim was inseparable from in-
terpretation of his CBA. Federal law therefore must resolve the dispute:
"[I]t is a question of federal contract interpretation whether there was an
obligation under this labor contract to provide the payments in a timely
manner, and, if so, whether Allis-Chalmers' conduct breached that im-
plied contract provision."40
In Allis-Chalmers, the Court stressed the concern for maintaining the
effectiveness of arbitration that it first articulated in Lucas Flour. If it
had upheld the Wisconsin tort, which "not only derive[d] from the con-
tract, but [was] defined by the contractual obligation of good faith," '41 em-
ployees would be free to bypass arbitration in cases that involved CBA
interpretation.4 Thus, the Court concluded that section 301 preempts
state law claims that are "substantially dependent upon analysis of the
terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract.""3
The "substantially dependent" test did not resolve the confusion sur-
rounding section 301 cases, however. As the Court said in Allis-Chalmers,
section 301 disputes would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis be-
cause of differences among state law claims and CBA terms.4 This case-
by-case analysis led to inconsistency among the circuit courts.
38. Id. at 207.
39. Id. at 213.
40. Id. at 215.
41. Id. at 218.
42. When an employee files a state law claim, he does not need to have the claim arbitrated first,
but if his claim arises under section 301, he must exhaust his arbitration remedy or his claim will be
dismissed. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967) ("it is settled that the employee must at
least attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by the bargaining
agreement.") (citation omitted); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965) (same).




B. Conflict Among the Circuits After Allis-Chalmers
Circuit courts interpreted the Allis-Chalmers approach to section 301
claims in conflicting ways. The disparity in approaches became evident in
the courts' treatment of retaliatory discharge causes of action under state
workers' compensation laws. To resolve the circuit split, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef."'
Lingle required the Supreme Court to decide between two approaches
to retaliatory discharge claims. The Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits
had held that protection against retaliatory discharge is a nonnegotiable
state law right that cannot be preempted by section 301,6 whereas the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits had ruled that section 301 does preempt re-
taliatory discharge claims because such claims are incorporated in CBA
"just cause" provisions. 7
C. Lingle and the Current Test for Section 301 Preemption
In Lingle, the Supreme Court opted to follow the Second, Third, and
Tenth Circuits' holding that section 301 does not preempt state retaliatory
discharge claims. Plaintiff Jonna Lingle had brought a state court claim
against her employer, the Norge Division of Magic Chef, under the Illi-
nois Workers' Compensation Act. Arbitration of her claim under the CBA
was already in progress."' The district court ruled that section 301 pre-
empted her claim, and the court of appeals affirmed."' In his opinion for
the Court, Justice Stevens defined the issue as "whether an employee cov-
ered by a collective-bargaining agreement that provides her with a con-
tractual remedy for discharge without just cause may enforce her state law
remedy for retaliatory discharge."' 0 The Court concluded that Lingle
could bring her claim in state court despite the CBA "just cause" provi-
sion. In reaching its decision, the Court cited the Allis-Chalmers preemp-
tion test, although the Court pointed out that the Seventh Circuit had
45. 108 S.Ct. 1877 (1988).
46. Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1987) (employee's
right under Connecticut statute prohibiting retaliatory discharge "absolute and cannot be waived" by
the CBA, and employee's claim therefore not preempted); Herring v. Prince Macaroni, 799 F.2d 120,
124, n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (employee's retaliatory discharge claim not preempted); Peabody Galion v.
Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309, 1319-20 (10th Cir. 1981) (employee's retaliatory discharge claim not pre-
empted; pre-Allis-Chalmers).
47. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 823 F.2d 1031, 1041 (7th Cir. 1987) (Seventh Circuit
"ha[s] consistently held that claims of retaliatory discharge brought by a worker who is covered by a
collective bargaining agreement are actually claims for wrongful discharge under the collective bar-
gaining agreement."); Johnson v. Hussmann Corp., 805 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1986) (employee's
retaliatory discharge claim preempted); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511, 517 (7th
Cir. 1985) (same).
48. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1878.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1879.
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misunderstood that test.5" The Court therefore tried to clarify the ruling
of Allis-Chalmers.
The Seventh Circuit had declared Lingle's claim preempted since in a
grievance proceeding under the CBA, an arbitrator would consider the
same facts that the state court would judge in Lingle's claim under the
Workers' Compensation Act.52 Under the Allis-Chalmers standard,
however,
even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agree-
ment, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require
addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law
claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the
claim is "independent" of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption
purposes.53
Since Lingle's rights under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act were
nonnegotiable, the court would not need to interpret the "just cause" pro-
vision of the CBA. As Justice Stevens explained:
For while there may be instances in which the National Labor Rela-
tions Act pre-empts state law on the basis of the subject matter of the
law in question, [here the Court inserted a footnote about Garmon
and Machinists preemption] § 301 pre-emption merely ensures that
federal law will be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining
agreements, and says nothing about the substantive rights a State
may provide to workers when adjudication of those rights does not
depend upon the interpretation of such agreements.5
Lingle's state law claim thus escaped preemption because it did not re-
quire interpretation of the CBA.
The Court reached the correct conclusion in Lingle. Previous Supreme
Court decisions such as Lucas Flour and Allis-Chalmers called for section
301 preemption because they involved claims that were at heart breach of
contract causes of action. 5 In cases where the claim does not depend on a
CBA for its existence, section 301 should have no preemptive force. Lingle
tried to make this clear, but its approach has improperly increased the
preemptive scope of section 301 by extending it to claims that are not
based on breach of contract. 6
Although Lingle held that a state law claim is not preempted just be-
cause it could have been brought under the CBA, the decision's language
51. Id. at 1881-83.
52. Id. at 1882-83.
53. Id. at 1883.
54. Id. (footnotes omitted).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 33-44.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 71-87.
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broadened the Allis-Chalmers holding: Lingle announced that section 301
preemption occurs when a plaintiff's state law claim "requires the inter-
pretation of a collective-bargaining agreement, ' 57 while Allis-Chalmers
called for section 301 preemption when resolution of the claim "is sub-
stantially dependent upon analysis" of the CBA terms.58 Under Lingle, a
plaintiff's claim could therefore be preempted if it requires CBA interpre-
tation only in assessing an employer's defense, whereas under Allis-
Chalmers that claim would probably escape preemption because it does
not "substantially depend" on CBA interpretation. Furthermore, the Al-
lis-Chalmers Court stressed the "narrow focus" of its decision since "[tihe
full scope of the pre-emptive effect of federal labor-contract law remains
to be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis." 9
Because the Lingle test could require courts to look at individual CBA's
to decide whether section 301 preempts a plaintiff's claim, the pre-Lingle
confusion is likely to continue. An examination of several post-Lingle cir-
cuit court cases shows the problems Lingle has created thus far.
D. Post-Lingle Circuit Court Adjudication of Section 301 Cases
1. Cases Involving Recognized State Law Claims
Circuit courts have inconsistently decided section 301 cases involving
recognized state law claims.6" Although the Lingle decision did lead sev-
eral courts of appeal to hold that section 301 does not preempt retaliatory
discharge and handicap discrimination claims,61 the confusion surround-
ing section 301 remains. The following discussion of post-Lingle decisions
demonstrates the need for a new section 301 preemption test.
In Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., the Lingle ruling led the Sixth Circuit
to reverse district court rulings in companion retaliatory discharge and
handicap discrimination cases."2 The court of appeals ruled that plaintiff
Fleming's retaliatory discharge cause of action was "essentially the same
57. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1885 (footnote omitted).
58. Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
59. Id.
60. A recognized or established claim is one that the state courts have already accepted as viable
under state statutory or common law. An unestablished claim is one that the state courts have not yet
had the opportunity to address, making it unclear whether the claim is cognizable under state law.
61. See, e.g., Merchant v. American S.S. Co., 860 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1988) (section 301 does not
preempt seaman's retaliatory discharge claim); Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514 (9th
Cir. 1988) (section 301 does not preempt plaintiff's handicap discrimination claim); Miller v. AT&T
Network Systems, 850 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (section 301 does not preempt plaintiff's
handicap discrimination claim, but does preempt his claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress). However, this does not mean that all retaliatory discharge and handicap discrimination actions
escape section 301 preemption. The analysis depends on the particular law. For example, some states
could make such rights subject to negotiation or applicable to non-union workers only.
62. 879 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir. 1989). This case consolidated two separate lawsuits brought by em-
ployees Smolarek and Fleming against Chrysler. Although the case is officially named Smolarek v.
Chrysler Corp., this Note's discussion focuses on Fleming's claims; for clarity the case will hereinafter
be referred to as Fleming.
19891
The Yale Law Journal
as the claim that the [Supreme] Court addressed in Lingle," 3 and there-
fore it was not preempted by section 301.
Fleming's handicap discrimination claim presented a more complicated
issue." Arguing for section 301 preemption, Chrysler asserted that the
provisions of the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act (HCRA) that
gave rise to Fleming's claim required CBA interpretation. Although the
right to be free from handicap discrimination is nonnegotiable, Chrysler
sought to prove that in determining whether Fleming's right had been
violated, "the HCRA itself requires reference to the 'terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.' ,,15 Chrysler also tried to distinguish the
HCRA from other states' anti-discrimination statutes because of its provi-
sion excluding from protection employees whose handicaps are related to
their job performance. 6
Rejecting Chrysler's arguments, the court ruled that Fleming's claim
could be determined without reliance on the CBA. According to the court,
Fleming had to show "(1) that Chrysler took adverse employment actions
against him and (2) that the actions were motivated by his handicap" to
establish a prima facie case under the HCRA. 7 Interpretation of the
CBA is irrelevant to these factual questions. If a court determined that
Fleming's handicap motivated Chrysler's actions, Chrysler would be liable
under the HCRA, regardless of the terms of the CBA. In its defense,
Chrysler only had to prove that its motives were based on a factor other
than Fleming's handicap.
The court summarized the central question as "What was Chrysler's
motivation?" 68 Chrysler would probably have argued that CBA terms mo-
tivated its actions. Yet interpretation of the CBA was unnecessary because
"in light of this defense, a court need only decide whether Chrysler took
actions adverse to Fleming because of his handicap or rather solely be-
cause Chrysler felt bound by the union agreement to take the actions or
for some other legitimate reason."69 It was therefore "not necessary to
63. Id. at 1331.
64. Smolarek appealed the district court's denial of his motion to remand, while Fleming appealed
the district court's decision that section 301 preempted his state law claims. Since Fleming's direct
appeal forces the court of appeals to decide the preemption question, the following discussion will
focus on Fleming's claim.
65. 879 F.2d at 1332. The relevant HORA sections provide that an employer cannot
"'[discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to . . . the terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment,'" or
[Ilimit, segregate, or classify an employee . . . in a way which deprives or tends to deprive an
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affects the status of an em-
ployee because of a handicap that is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties
of a particular job or position.
Id. at 1331-32 (citing MICH. Comp. LAWS § 37.1202(1)(b),(c)).
66. Id. at 1332.






decide at the outset whether or not Chrysler's interpretation of the agree-
ment is correct as a matter of federal labor law.""0
The Sixth Circuit made a fine distinction between finding that Chrysler
acted out of its obligations under the CBA and defining those CBA obli-
gations: How can a court determine whether Chrysler acted according to
the CBA if it does not interpret the CBA terms? According to the court,
because Chrysler needed to prove only that Fleming's handicap did not
motivate its actions, the CBA terms were irrelevant.
Although the Sixth Circuit reached the correct result, the Lingle test
required it to strain to find that CBA interpretation was not necessary to
resolve Fleming's claim. The court could just as easily have decided the
case the opposite way under Lingle. Even if Chrysler's defense did re-
quire CBA interpretation, Fleming's claim should not have been pre-
empted. His claim did not rely on a breach of the CBA, and Chrysler
brought in the CBA terms as a defense. Under this Note's proposed ap-
proach, the court could have held that section 301 did not preempt Flem-
ing's claim immediately after finding that the HCRA provided Fleming
with independent state law rights.
Using the same Lingle preemption test, the Ninth Circuit decided a
case that seems to contradict the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Fleming. In
Newberry v. Pacific Racing Association,1 the court ruled that section 301
preempted plaintiff Newberry's claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 2 Newberry asserted that she "'suffered humiliation,
mental anguish, and emotional distress' " from the defendant's decision to
terminate her "'with no direct evidence and without just cause to accuse
[her] of theft and gross dereliction of duty' " after only " 'a cursory inves-
tigation into various racetrack operations including those within [New-
berry]'s position.' ,,73
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a tort claim recognized by
California courts. 4 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Newberry's emo-
tional distress claim depended upon interpretation of the CBA between
her union and Pacific Racing Association. According to the Court, "it is
clear that Newberry's emotional distress claim arises out of her discharge
and the defendant's conduct in the investigation leading up to it.' '"1 Since
70. Id. (emphasis in original). See also Bettis v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 878 F.2d 192, 197
(7th Cir. 1989) (reasoning similar to Fleming).
71. 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988).
72. Id. at 1149-50. The court also ruled that section 301 preempted Newberry's breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, but that is not controversial since the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is derived from and implied in the CBA.
73. Id. at 1149 (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
74. See, e.g., Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593, 595 P.2d 975, 983, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 198, 206 (1979) (court describes necessary elements for establishing prima facie case of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress); see also 6 CAL.JUR.3D (REv.), Assault and Other Wilful Torts
§§ 95-106 (1988).
75. Newberry, 854 F.2d at 1149.
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Newberry's CBA included a provision that employees could not be fired
without just cause, her claim would require interpretation of the agree-
ment's terms. Section 301 therefore preempted Newberry's claim.
Under the proposed test the Ninth Circuit would have come to the op-
posite conclusion. Newberry's claim could be assessed under independent
state law standards without regard to her CBA. 6 Even if the Pacific Rac-
ing Association's defense required CBA interpretation, Newberry's claim
should not have been preempted. The court could have used federal law to
interpret the CBA in evaluating Pacific's defense. It could have then pro-
ceeded to adjudicate Newberry's tort claim under state law standards.
Newberry's claim was independent of the CBA, and her employer should
not have been able to cause preemption by asserting a CBA-based defense.
Although the court could have decided this case correctly under Lingle,
the broad scope of the Lingle test caused it unnecessary confusion.7
76. As defined by California courts, a prima facie showing of intentional infliction of emotional
distress includes three elements: "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the inten-
tion of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress, and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emo-
tional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct." Cervantez, 24 Cal. 3d at 593, 595 P.2d at 983,
156 Cal. Rptr. at 206. In addition, "[c]onduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all
bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community." Id. Newberry's emotional distres3 claim
could be evaluated under this state law standard without interpreting the CBA. The state law stan-
dard exists independent of any contract. See Comment, supra note 20, at 1005 (intentional infliction
of emotional distress is "recognized cause[] of action under the California employment at-will doc-
trine"; employees without employment contracts can bring suits for intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
77. Under the Lingle test, a claim is preempted only if it requires CBA interpretation. The state
law standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress is independent of employment contracts.
See supra note 76. Just as in Fleming, the question is a factual one of intent. In its defense, Pacific
Racing Association must prove only that its actions were motivated by factors other than the intent to
inflict emotional distress. Although Pacific might have wanted to use the "just cause" provision of the
CBA as a defense to Newberry's claim, her claim concerned the manner in which Pacific terminated
her employment and conducted an investigation of her conduct. Therefore, a "just cause" defense was
not necessarily relevant, and even if it were, the court could decide that Pacific was motivated by its
belief that it had "just cause" under the CBA.
Moreover, Newberry's claim implicated more than a wrongful discharge cause of action: Her alle-
gations about the cursory investigation and the false accusation of "'theft and gross dereliction of
duty,'" Newberry, 854 F.2d 1142 at 1149 (quoting plaintiff's complaint), could have been character-
ized as defamation causes of action as well. See, e.g., Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 536
(9th Cir. 1987) (defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims not preempted by
section 301 since California defamation law establishes nonnegotiable rights and plaintiff's emotional
distress claim can be determined without reference to CBA). Under the Lingle test, Newberry's claim
therefore should not have been preempted because it did not require reference to the CBA.
The Seventh Circuit also recently held that section 301 preempted a plaintiff's intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim. Douglas v. American Information Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565 (7th
Cir. 1989). The court ruled that addressing the plaintiff's allegations of harassment, some of which
overlapped with subjects covered by the CBA, required CBA interpretation: "Resolution of Ms.
Douglas' claim will require a court to interpret the collective bargaining agreement in order to deter-
mine whether or not Illinois Bell's allegedly wrongful conduct was authorized under the collective
bargaining agreement." Id. at 572. This kind of interpretation was only necessary to evaluate Bell's
defense, and therefore Douglas' claim should not have been preempted.
Douglas' claim derived from the state law right to be free from intentional infliction of emotional
distress, rather than from her CBA. Since Douglas could have brought this claim under state law
without a CBA, her complaint would not be preempted under the proposed test. This does not mean
that the CBA would be ignored in deciding Douglas' claim. The court would use federal law to
Section 301 Preemption
2. Cases Involving Non-Established State Law Claims
The Lingle test has also caused problems for federal courts considering
unestablished state law claims. The First Circuit case Jackson v. Liquid
Carbonic Corp.78 provides an example of how the Lingle test incorrectly
allows preemption of claims that are not based on breach of the CBA.
In Jackson, the plaintiff asserted that his employer's drug-testing pro-
gram was a violation of his right to privacy under the Massachusetts Con-
stitution and under a Massachusetts privacy statute. Focusing on Jack-
son's state statutory claim, the court first concluded that the
Massachusetts Supreme Court had not recognized any nonnegotiable right
to be free from drug-testing, although it had not explicitly rejected such a
right.79 The court explained that in such circumstances it could proceed
on the basis of how the Massachusetts Supreme Court would likely re-
solve plaintiff's claim. 80
The First Circuit then applied the Lingle test and asked, "[C]an Jack-
son's privacy claim be made out without interpreting the Agreement?"'"
The court concluded that CBA interpretation was necessary and ruled
that section 301 preempted Jackson's claim. According to the court, cer-
tain drug-testing plans would violate Massachusetts law, but to determine
whether a particular plan was illegal, the state court would undertake a
balancing of factors, including the interpretation of a CBA.82 The Court
searched Jackson's CBA for any relevant provisions and concluded that
interpretation of the contract's management rights clause was integral to
resolving Jackson's claim.83
The First Circuit's approach may have been correct under Lingle, but
it led to the undesirable result that Jackson's claim, which was not based
on a CBA breach, was preempted. The court's analysis was faulty in sev-
eral respects. First, as Judge Bownes pointed out in his dissent, "[ilt is for
the Massachusetts courts to make [the] determination" whether state law
provides an independent privacy right to be free from mandatory drug
interpret the CBA where it was relevant to Douglas' allegations and her employer's defense.
The Seventh Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit (Compare Newberry with Tellez, supra), has not ruled
that section 301 preempts all intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, however. See, e.g.,
Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways, 825 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs' emotional distress claim
based on defendant's verbal assaults not preempted). Adoption of this Note's proposed test would
make courts' approach to preemption of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims more
consistent.
78. 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1988). Other post-Lingle cases have also held that § 301 preempts
unestablished state law claims. See, e.g., Laws v. Calmat, 852 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1988) (section 301
preempts plaintiff's claim that employer's drug-testing program violated California constitution); Util-
ity Workers of Am., Local 246 v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1988) (same).
79. 863 F.2d at 115.
80. Id. at 116.
81. Id. at 114.
82. Id. at 117.
83. Id. at 120.
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testing. 4 Because this question was still unclear, Jackson's case should
have been remanded to the state court.8 5
Second, Judge Bownes asserted that "there is nothing in the collective-
bargaining agreement which even remotely deals with the subject of drug
testing or privacy rights." 8 This statement reveals a mistake that courts
make in applying the Lingle preemption approach: they look to the CBA
to see if any of its clauses require interpretation. Courts instead should
look only at the plaintiff's state law claim to decide the preemption
question.
The First Circuit's analysis stemmed from its starting point of asking
whether resolution of Jackson's claim required any CBA interpretation.
Under this Note's proposed test, the court would have asked only whether
Jackson's claim was based on a CBA breach or arose directly from the
CBA. Clearly Jackson's claim did not fall under either of these categories,
and therefore it should not have been preempted. Jackson claimed that the
Massachusetts Constitution and a Massachusetts privacy statute protected
him from mandatory drug testing. Preemption would have been proper
only if Jackson had claimed that his employer violated the Massachusetts
laws because the CBA guaranteed him the right to be free from drug
testing.
In addition, while the First Circuit may have been right in predicting
that Massachusetts courts would use a balancing test to resolve Jackson's
claim under the privacy statute and that they would examine the CBA in
this process, this use would only be in Liquid Carbonic (L-Corp)'s de-
fense. The CBA was not an essential element of Jackson's claim, and the
court explicitly recognized this by focusing on the management rights
clause, which may or may not have given L-Corp the right to implement
a drug-testing program. Since section 301 concerns suits for breaches of
CBA's, it should not preempt causes of action that do not rely on a CBA
violation for their existence. In short, the First Circuit's application of the
Lingle test in Jackson gave section 301's preemptive power an overly
broad scope.
Prior to Lingle, the Tenth Circuit used an approach to unestablished
state law claims that is consistent with this Note's proposal and contrasts
with the First Circuit's reasoning in Jackson. In United Assoc. of Jour-
neymen, Local No. 57 v. Bechtel Power Corp.,87 the court found that
section 301 did not preempt plaintiffs' state law blacklisting claims, 8 even
84. Id. at 123 (Bownes, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
85. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n. of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (developed Pull-
man abstention doctrine: Federal courts should abstain from deciding unclear questions of state law).
A detailed discussion of the Pullman doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note.
86. 863 F.2d at 122 (Bownes, J., dissenting).
87. 834 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1987).
88. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had violated the Utah constitution and Utah statutes that
prohibited employers from blacklisting employees, which is defined as keeping former employees from
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though blacklisting claims were currently unrecognized by Utah state
courts. The court reasoned that if such a claim did exist under state law,
"it is derived entirely from rights and duties created by state law and not
from the terms, express or implied, of the collective bargaining agreement
here invoked.""9 Unlike the First Circuit in the Jackson case, the Tenth
Circuit recognized that although the CBA might be necessary to resolu-
tion of plaintiffs' claim, it would only be brought in "to show waiver or
consent as a state-law defense to plaintiffs' allegations of blacklisting."9
Even if blacklisting turns out to be a negotiable state law right, plaintiffs'
claim would not be preempted.
In addition, the Tenth Circuit focused on whether the "plaintiffs' com-
plaint essentially alleges a violation of the collective bargaining agreement
... -9" This is the key test under the proposed approach-whether the
plaintiff could bring her state law claim without a CBA. If so, section 301
should have no preemptive power. This contrasts with the First Circuit's
focus on whether resolution of Jackson's claim would involve CBA inter-
pretation. It is interesting that the First Circuit decided Jackson after Lin-
gle, since comparing Jackson and Bechtel indicates that the Supreme
Court's language in Lingle has increased section 301's preemptive scope.
III. A NEW APPROACH FOR SECTION 301 CLAIMS
A. A Suggested Modification of the Lingle Preemption Test
The Newberry and Jackson cases help show why the Lingle test should
be modified. This Note proposes looking only at the plaintiff's state law
right to determine whether section 301 preemption should occur. If the
plaintiff asserts a state statutory or common law claim that is independent
of the CBA in that it could be asserted without reliance on an employ-
ment contract, then section 301 should not preempt the claim. The courts
would confront a much simpler task than examining both the state law
and" the CBA to determine whether an employee's action "substantially
depend[s]"9' 2 on CBA interpretation. Courts would declare section 301
preemption in only the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract,
(2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (for ex-
ample, plaintiff Lueck's claim in Allis-Chalmers), and (3) claims that are
clearly based directly on violation of the CBA (for example, if plaintiff's
sole support for her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is an
obtaining subsequent employment, by publishing lists of discharged employees "for the purpose of
preventing such employee[s] from engaging in or securing similar or other employment from any other
person, company or corporation." UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-24-1 (1988). See Bechtel, 834 F.2d at
885-86 n.2.
89. Bechtel, 834 F.2d at 889.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 887.
92. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
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allegation that defendant breached the CBA). An alternative formulation
of this test is if a non-union employee can maintain a cause of action
under a state statute or under common law without reference to an em-
ployment contract, then a union employee should be afforded the same
opportunity.93
In a case like Newberry, the proposed preemption test should not lead
to results different from an accurate application of the Supreme Court
Lingle test.94 But this will not be true in all section 301 cases. For exam-
ple, the First Circuit's application of Lingle in Jackson was at least ar-
guably correct, assuming that the CBA included terms relevant to Jack-
son's drug-testing claim. This Note's proposal would eliminate the
following part of a footnote in Lingle which may have caused confusion
about the preemptive scope of section 301:
While it may be true that most state laws that are not pre-empted by
§ 301 will grant nonnegotiable rights that are shared by all state
workers, we note that neither condition ensures nonpre-emption. It
is conceivable that a State could create a remedy that, although non-
negotiable, nonetheless turned on the interpretation of a collective-
bargaining agreement for its application. Such a remedy would be
pre-empted by § 301." 5
The footnote may be referring to two situations where, under Lingle, a
plaintiff's nonnegotiable state law claim would be preempted. First, an
employer could assert a defense that genuinely requires interpretation of
the CBA. For example, an employee could file a nonnegotiable state law
claim against his employer for wrongful discharge due to handicap dis-
crimination. The employer could answer that she discharged the employee
because he violated the CBA's mandatory drug testing provision, not be-
cause of his handicap. To assess the employer's defense, the court should
examine the CBA terms to see if the employee breached the agreement.
The court would therefore need to interpret the CBA even though the
employee asserted an independent state law claim. Under Lingle, the em-
ployee's claim would be preempted because it requires CBA
interpretation.
In contrast, under the proposed approach, the employee's claim would
not be preempted. His claim is not for breach of contract or breach of
implied contractual rights, and it does not directly rely on the CBA. Al-
lowing preemption in this type of case would encourage employers to as-
93. There are exceptions, however, when a state specifically limits a certain law or public policy
to non-union employees. Otherwise, if an at-will employee (an employee without a contract) can bring
a state law claim, then that claim by definition arises from law that is separate from an employment
contract.
94. The Newberry court's mistaken holding stems directly from the confusion engendered by Lin-
gle's overly broad preemption test, however. See supra note 77.
95. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1882 n.7 (1988).
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sert invalid defenses to defeat employees' state law claims. In addition, a
nonnegotiable handicap discrimination claim should not be characterized
as a section 301 cause of action because that would require the employee
to arbitrate his claim before filing suit. It is not the arbitrator's role to
evaluate independent state law claims. The employee's handicap discrimi-
nation claim itself does not refer to CBA terms, and it is only the em-
ployer's defense that raises a federal question. The state court can assess
this defense under its concurrent jurisdiction to interpret CBA's.96 The
court must use federal law in interpreting the CBA, but after evaluating
the validity of the employer's defense the court would use independent
state law standards to resolve the employee's handicap discrimination
claim.
A second example of a nonnegotiable state law right that requires CBA
interpretation occurs when an element of the plaintiff's claim demands
reference to CBA terms. A nonnegotiable handicap discrimination law
that requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that he meets all the job require-
ments before proving wrongful discharge may necessitate examination of
CBA job description provisions.97 Under the proposed test, the plaintiff's
claim would not be preempted; however, since his state law claim is not
completely independent from the CBA, he should be required to arbitrate
the issues involving CBA interpretation before bringing a state court
action.98
This approach would not allow the plaintiff to avoid the CBA arbitra-
tion provisions. At the same time, section 301 would not preempt his non-
negotiable claim. The heart of the plaintiff's claim is handicap discrimina-
tion, and the necessary CBA interpretation does not decide whether the
employer violated state law. Once the arbitrator has interpreted how the
CBA defined the relevant job requirements, the major state law questions
remain as to whether the plaintiff met those requirements, and if so,
96. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
97. If the Sixth Circuit had accepted Chrysler's view that Michigan's Handicappers' Civil Rights
Act (HCRA) "requires reference to the 'terms, conditions, and privileges of employment'-matters
defined by the collective bargaining agreement," Fleming would be an example of such a case. See
Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1332 (6th Cir. 1989). However, the Sixth Circuit ruled
that these terms would not need to be defined in determining whether Chrysler violated the CBA,
since the plaintiff had to show only "that Chrysler took adverse employment actions against him"
because of his handicap. Id. at 1334.
98. An arbitrator's role is to interpret the CBA, not state or federal law. See, e.g., Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (in subsequent Title VII suit, court need not defer to
arbitrator's decision regarding race discrimination). The arbitrator therefore should interpret the
CBA's job requirements and leave the ultimate handicap discrimination question to the courts. In this
case the plaintiff should be required to arbitrate the relevant OBA provisions before proceeding with
his state law claim because his prima facie case relies on CBA terms. However, this does not make his
claim a section 301 action because he is not alleging any breach of contract. In addition, an at-will
employee would be able to bring an analogous lawsuit under the state handicap discrimination statute
without relying on any contract-he would just need to show in another way that he fulfilled his
employer's job requirements. Plaintiff's claim should therefore remain unpreempted.
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whether the employer's actions toward the plaintiff were motivated by
handicap discrimination.
The proposed limitation of the scope of the Lingle preemption test is
consistent with prior Supreme Court jurisprudence and with the purposes
of section 301. State law claims should escape preemption as long as they
do not rely on the existence of a CBA. If an independent right or remedy
is nonnegotiable, then by definition it cannot be waived by contract. If an
independent right is negotiable, then the CBA will require interpretation
only in the assessment of the employer's defense, which will usually allege
that the plaintiff waived the negotiable right.
B. The Proposed Test Is Consistent with the Policies Underlying Fed-
eral Preemption of State Labor Law
When deciding in favor of federal preemption of state labor law claims
in section 301 cases, the Supreme Court has advanced several major policy
justifications. First, the Court has cited congressional intent: "[W]e cannot
but conclude that in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal
labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules."99 Addition-
ally, the Court has pointed out that allowing claims arising under section
301 to be determined by state laws that may be inconsistent with federal
law would create problems in negotiating CBA's and in resolving griev-
ances under CBA's.' 00 Therefore, section 301 preemption should not be
limited only to suits alleging breach of contract but should extend to suits
which depend on the existence of the CBA:
The interests in interpretive uniformity and predictability that re-
quire that labor-contract disputes be resolved by reference to federal
law also require that the meaning given a contract phrase or term be
subject to uniform federal interpretation. Thus, questions relating to
what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal conse-
quences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement,
must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such
questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a
suit alleging liability in tort.' 0 '
Finally, parties should not be able to sidestep arbitration proceedings by
basing their complaints in state law when they really constitute breach of
the CBA claims.' °2
99. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
100. Id. at 103-04.
101. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985).
102. Several commentators have argued for increased federal preemption of state labor law in
general and have included section 301 claims in their discussions. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 4, at




All of these policy reasons are very important for state law claims that
cannot exist without a CBA. There is no question that section 301 calls
for the application of a uniform body of federal law when a court inter-
prets CBA terms. None of these reasons has legitimate applicability, how-
ever, to preemption of claims that are based on independent state statutory
or common law.103 If a state law claim does require some CBA interpreta-
tion, as in a case where the employer asserts that her employee breached
the CBA, the courts can apply federal law to the employer's defense with-
out any need for section 301 preemption. If a plaintiff's claim does not
rely on a contract, then she is not unfairly avoiding arbitration
procedures.
Thus, section 301 should not preempt independent or nonnegotiable
state law claims, even if they could have been arbitrated under a CBA
grievance procedure. Congress gave no explicit indication of its intent re-
garding the preemptive scope of section 301. T1 Preemption should there-
fore be limited to suits that fall under the language of the statute, claims
which are "for violation of" CBA's.0 5 Other forms of labor law preemp-
tion doctrine will invalidate state laws that interfere with the purposes of
the NLRA. 0 6 Since Congress did not intend that the NLRA preempt all
state law affecting employment relations, federalism concerns dictate that
state laws which survive Garmon and Machinists preemption analysis
and which do not rely directly on a CBA for enforcement remain un-
preempted by section 301.
Moreover, this Note's independent state rights preemption test reflects a
concern for individual union employees' rights. In passing section 301,
Congress did not intend to give union workers fewer rights than non-
union workers.10 7 If an employer could eliminate a union member's right
to bring a state law action simply by asserting a defense requiring CBA
interpretation, employees would see unionization as a less desirable alter-
native. States have been passing more laws protecting at-will employees,
and if union members cannot take advantage of these laws, employees will
perceive that unions limit their state law rights.
The proposed approach also maintains the effectiveness of arbitration.
Often CBA's contain rights greater than those provided by state law, and
103. In addition, claims that involve only peripheral CBA interpretation should not be preempted.
See supra Section IIIA. State courts can fulfill the uniformity requirement by using their concurrent
jurisdiction under Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), to apply federal law to
interpret the CBA.
104. See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 208; H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
1947 U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 1135, 1172.
105. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 20-30.
107. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) ("It would
turn the policy that animated the Wagner Act [NLRA] on its head to understand it to have penalized
workers who have chosen to join a union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regula-
tions imposing minimal standards on nonunion employers.").
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in such cases it would be advantageous for the plaintiff to file a grievance
under the CBA. The arbitrator's role is to resolve disputes that involve
alleged breaches of contract, not to interpret state or federal law." 8
Furthermore, the proposed test will not disrupt the current collective
bargaining system. The Garmon and Machinists preemption doctrines en-
sure that states cannot regulate certain mandatory bargaining subjects that
would interfere too much with the collective bargaining process. There-
fore, collective bargaining remains vital for determining issues such as
wages, hours, and working conditions.
Adoption of the suggested approach will not unfairly disadvantage em-
ployers. The nonnegotiable and independent state laws in question were
created to protect employees. Employers with unionized employees should
not be able to avoid their obligations under these state laws by using sec-
tion 301 preemption as a defense. Section 301 preemption does not pre-
sent a choice of favoring employees or employers-it is limited to claims
for breach of contract. Additionally, cases exist in which an employee
voted against unionization,"0 9 and believes that the union and the CBA do
not protect his rights adequately. In such cases, it is more equitable to
allow the aggrieved employee to bring a state law action that is viable
without reference to the CBA." 0
IV. CONCLUSION
State and federal courts should adopt this preemption test: If a plaintiff
asserts an independent or nonnegotiable state law claim in a case involv-
ing a section 301 question, then the claim is not preempted. There is no
need for a court to look at the CBA. This approach has several advan-
tages. First, it protects the individual rights of unionized workers by al-
lowing them to assert nonnegotiable state law claims without federal pre-
emption. Second, it allows states to regulate areas that Congress meant to
leave within state jurisdiction. But at the same time, federal substantive
law still governs CBA interpretation and breach of contract claims, which
is imperative under section 301. Finally, the results of section 301 cases
should become more consistent under the proposed approach, and section
301 preemption will be limited to claims arising from the CBA.
108. See supra note 98.
109. A union only needs a majority of the workers to vote for unionization in order to organize a
particular workforce.
110. Some pre-Lingle commentators agree that section 301 preemption should be more limited
and advocate the well-pleaded complaint rule. See, e.g., Schwartz & Parrot, A New Look at Labor
Law Preemption: Unionized Employees' Claims in State Court, 7 ST. Louis PuB. L. REv. 297
(1988); Comment, Intimations of Federal Removal Jurisdiction in Labor Cases: The Pleadings
Nexus, 1981 DUKE L.J. 743 (advocates limiting federal jurisdiction in labor law preemption cases).
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